In this note, in an independent private values auction framework, I discuss the relationship between the set of types and the distribution of types. I show that any set of types, finite dimensional or not, can be extended to a larger set of types preserving incentive compatibility constraints, expected revenue and bidder's expected utilities. Thus for example we may convexify a set of types making our model amenable to the large body of theory in economics and mathematics that relies on convexity assumptions. An interesting application of this extension procedure is to show that although revenue equivalence is not valid in general if the set of types is not convex these mechanism have underlying distinct allocation mechanism in the extension. Thus we recover in these situations the revenue equivalence. JEL Classification: D44
Introduction
In this paper I study the relationship between types and distributions in an independent private values auction framework. The simplest assumption we can make on the set of possible types 1 of an economic agent 2 is that it is a finite set T . This however soon becomes unsatisfactory. Auction equilibria are in mixed strategies. We cannot use calculus, most distributions requires a continuum of types to exist and so on. The second simplest assumption we can make is that T is a non-degenerated interval model with I bidders. Thus suppose T i , the set of types of Bidder i = 1; : : : ; I, is given or appear endogenously in our model. Can we say something about the optimal auction? Can we talk about revenue equivalence if T i is not convex? I will show that if we have M = (q; P) a voluntary participation, incentive compatible mechanism defined on T := Π I i=1 T i we can extend this mechanism, preserving voluntary participation and incentive compatibility constraints to a mechanismM defined oñ T := Π I i=1T i ' T . The only restriction we impose onT i is the minimal requirement of Pr T i nT i ¡ = 0.
Suppose T i & R is closed but is not an interval. How can we extend T i toT i = con T i = [min T i ; sup T i ] ? Skreta (2006) present a method to extend an optimal mechanism (q; P) defined on T toT . To understand his extension note first thatT i n T i is a countable union of disjoint intervals I l = (a l ; b l ). That isT i n T i = ∞ l=1 I l . The extended mechanism is constant in I l . This method works if we are looking for the optimal mechanism. In this case as Skreta shows a bidder with type a l < s < b l chooses as type a l . This method will not work if: (1) we allow for non-closed sets of types 3 ; (2) we want to extend mechanisms that are not optimal (like a first-price auction mechanism without a reserve price); (3) we have a higher dimensionality set of types. The extension procedure I will introduce allows for abstract set of types and any incentive compatible mechanism.
Once the extension procedure is accomplished we have very nice consequences. First we may search for the optimal auction in a classical setup. Thus suppose the set of types x P T i has a distribution F i and this distribution has a density f i : T i 3 (0; ∞). Extending T i toT i = con T i we still have a densityf i ;T i 3 [0; ∞) butf i (x) = 0 inT i n T i . Thus we would like to apply Myerson's (1981) characterization of the optimal auction. This is however not possible since a key hypothesis of Myerson (1981) is the strict positivity of the density onT i . We may however apply Monteiro and Svaiter (2007) which characterizes the optimal auction for any distribution. A second consequence of the extension is that we recover revenue equivalence. For example if we initially have a two types set T i = fa;bg and two bidders. The optimal auction and the second price auction have the same allocation rule q but do not have the same payment rule P. However if we extend the set of types toT i = [a; b] we see that the second-price auction and the optimal auction have distinct allocation rules which implies distinct payment rules.
A third consequence of the extension procedure is to make it clear that what matters is the distribution of types. The extension procedure adds a probability zero set of types. It makes it harder to satisfy incentive compatibility constraints. But those additional types should not matter. They do not change expected utilities nor expected revenue.
Review of the auction model
I first review the auction model with an abstract set of types. Let (Ω i ; B i ) be a measurable space. Define A i = fBS i ; B P B i g and let (S i ; A i ; µ i ) be a probability space, i = 1; : : : ; I. We extend µ i to B i in a natural way: µ i (B) = µ i (B S i ). Thus µ i (S c i ) = 0. The valuation of Bidder i with type s P S i is given by U i (s) where
. Let S := Π I i=1 S i and µ = µ 1 ¢:::¢µ I be the product probability. Thus the joint distribution is
An object is to be sold at an auction with I bidders. Each bidder knows his valuation
(1) q = (q 1 ; : : : ; q I ), q i :
The auction proceeds as follows: (ii) Bidder i = 1; : : : ; I pays P i (s); (iii) Bidder i receives the object with probability q i (s).
The direct mechanism (q; P) has to satisfy incentive compatibility (IC) and voluntary participations (VP) constraints. That is, for every
Finally the seller's expected revenue is
I finish this section with a lemma that will be used in the next section.
Lemma 1
The expected payment P i (¡) is bounded from below.
Proof: Fix a P S i . The incentive compatibility constraint implies that for every s P S i , U i (a)Q i (a) P i (a) ! U i (a)Q i (s) P i (s). Thus P i (s) ! jU i (a)j + P i (a) ending the proof.
The extension procedure
Suppose (q; P) is voluntary participation incentive compatible mechanism on S. We want to extend (q; P) to an voluntary participation incentive compatible mechanism on Ω = Ω 1 ¢:::¢Ω I . Let X i = f(Q i (u); P i (u)); u P S i g and A i := X i f(0;0)g. Define T i : S i 3 R the surplus: T i (s) = U i (s) Q i (s) P i (s). I begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 2 There exists a convex function φ i : R 3 R + such that φ i U i = T i . And for every s P S i it is true that Q i (s) P ∂φ i U i (s) ¡ .
Proof: Define φ i : R 3 R by φ i (z) = sup (Q;P)PA i zQ P: Lemma 1 implies that φ i (z) is finite. And (0; 0) P A i implies φ i (z) ! 0. Since φ i is a supremum of linear functions, z 3 z ¡Q P it is a convex function. Fix s P S i and z H := U i (s). The incentive compatibility constraints imply that z H Q i (s) P i (s) ! z H Q i (x) P i (x) for every x P S i and therefore
Note also that for every s P S i we have that
To define the extension I begin defining Q i : Ω i 3 [0; 1] andP i : Ω i 3 R:
(1)
I now define the probabilities q = (q 1 ; : : : ; q I ) for ω P Ω. Let fe 1 ; e 2 ; : : : ; e I g be the canonical basis of R I . Thus e 1 = (1; 0; : : : ; 0) and so on. For every ω P Ω let I(ω) = f1 j I; ω j T P S j g. Thus the seller keeps the object if at least two bidders announces ω j T P S j . If only Bidder i announces ω i = P S i thenq j (ω) = 0 for every j T = i. And q i (ω) = Q i (ω i ).
Lemma 3 It is true that
Proof:
First note that the integral over Ω i n S i is null. If x P S i then q i (x; y) = q i (x; y) for every y P S i and l = R Ω i q i (x; y)dµ i (y) = Q i (x) = Q i (x). If x T P S i then q i (x; y) = Q i (x) for every y P S i and l = Q i (x) since µ i (S i ) = 1. QED
Theorem 1
The extended mechanism q; P ¡ satisfies voluntary participation and incentive compatibility constraints. It gives the same expected utility for Bidder i if his type belongs to S i and gives the same revenue for the seller.
. Therefore T i (ω) ! 0 and voluntary participation is satisfied. Incentive compatibility is also true:
Finally bidders' payoffs and seller's revenue are the same since µ i S c i ¡ = 0.
Remark 1 It is clear from the construction that if S H
i is another set of types such that the distribution F i is the same then Bidder's expected utilities is the same and seller's revenue also is the same.
I now show how to make this extension in a simple example. In the optimal auction the allocation q is the same as in the second price auction. However payment is different. The expected payment of type a is P 1 (a) = a 4
: The expected payment of tybe b is P 1 (b) = 3 Implications of the extension procedure for revenue equivalence
In example 1 above we saw that distinct payment rules are possible for the same allocation rules if the set of types is not convex. I will show that if we enlarge the set of types (preserving the distribution as before) we may define an allocation rule which gives the right payoff. Thus by enlarging the set of types we may recover the revenue equivalence theorem. That is, the allocation rule for bidders that are "virtual" matters.
Theorem 2 Suppose U i (Ω i ) ' conU i (S i ). Then the payment P i is a function of Q i .
Proof: Let S = ffxg;x P Rg be the set of singletons of real numbers. Let e : S 3R be defined by e (fxg) = x. For every u P U i (Ω i ) it is true thatQ i (U i ∞Q i (u)du.
